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ABSTRACT Online shopping is an important part of the development of the Internet and plays a critical
role in the current and future economy. However, there are many risks in the trading process. In order to
reduce the hidden risks, it is necessary to study the method of risk identification. This paper proposes user
risk identification method of online shopping system based on Complex Event Process (CEP). In this paper,
we use the Esper as the CEP engine and the risk behavior patterns are defined as the event pattern language.
Firstly, the CEP system captures event streams by analyzing data streams in real-time. Secondly, the captured
event streams are sent to the CEP’s engine. Finally, the Esper intelligently analyzes user’s online shopping
risk behaviors in real-time according to the event pattern languages. User risk identification effectively
guarantees the fund and account security of the shopping users.
INDEX TERMS Complex event process, behavior patterns, risk identification, esper, intelligent analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Internet industry has shown a boom-
ing development tread, the increasing number of users have
provided a powerful impetus for the rapid growth of online
shopping. More and more people use online payment for
shopping systems, which facilitates people’s lives and has
become a core part. However, there are many loopholes in
the processes of payment. The criminals use the loopholes to
carry out the illegal and criminal activities, which pose a great
threat to the online shopping users’ funds and account secu-
rity. Therefore, to propose a system that could perform real-
time identification of online shopping behavior is extremely
urgent.
In order to ensure the security of online shopping, tradi-
tional research methods mainly focused on identity authen-
tication such as the digital certificate [1], [2], encryption
technology [3], and dynamic verification code [4], [5], etc.
However, the identity authentication cannot guarantee the
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Yongtao Hao.
legitimacy of users’ behaviors. For example, while the user
identity is legal, he/she can achieve malicious purposes by
using API calls, multiple accounts information to achieving
alternative attacks, and spoofing identity. Currently, there are
many such cases [6]–[10]. Another part of researches focused
on secure protocols [11]. However, these studies cannot guar-
antee the security of users’ behavior.
Complex event processing (CEP) is an analysis technol-
ogy based on event flow in a dynamic environment and a
relatively complete event processing framework, which can
achieve efficient access to real-time data streams and pro-
vide advanced query functions [12]–[16], which is an ideal
framework [17] in the process of online shopping. Real-time
monitoring of the user’s shopping data streams and intel-
ligent identification of shopping behavior risks, which can
effectively improve the security of online shopping. Events
usually refer to meaningful state changes. The complex event
processing platform converts the data streams into event
streams by using techniques such as filtering, byte filling
and aggregation, then sends the obtained event streams to
the engine, and formulates event pattern languages (EPL)
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according to the timing relationship and logical relationship
between the events, and finally make continuous queries on
the sequences of the events that meet the requirements of
the event streams [18], [19]. The CEP engine is a major
component of the CEP system that handles events. In this
paper, the CEP engine we use is Esper, an open source, JAVA-
based, lightweight, and extensible event stream processing
engine [20]–[22]. The research on complex event processing
is mainly applied to financial detection [23], [24], intrusion
detection [25], RFID reading [26]–[28], and wireless sensor
network [29]. However, in the literature, as we know, it is
rarely used in online shopping.
This paper proposes a CEP based risk identification
method for online shopping systems, which mainly includes
the following aspects: Firstly, the users’ shopping data
streams are preprocessed and event patterns are formulated
according to the risk behaviors of online shopping users. Sec-
ondly, Esper identifies the users’ shopping behaviors through
the event pattern languages. Finally, the risk events are sent
to the response processing template for the early warning
operation.
Therefore, the main contributions described in this paper
mainly include:
• We divide the behaviors according to the role for identi-
fying user risk in online shopping systems.
• We extract behaviors from the original shopping data
streams, and then design the corresponding user risk
behavior patterns as the basis for logic reasoning.
• We translate user risk behavior patterns into EPL and
then identify user risk behaviors in Esper.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces
the methods used in the paper. Section III introduces the
specific implementation of CEP for online shopping risk
identification. Section IV concludes this paper.
II. METHODS
This section introduces the related knowledge of CEP, and
then, describes the event patterns of online shopping risk
identification.
A. CEP FRAMEWORK FOR ONLINE SHOPPING
RISK IDENTIFICATION
The CEP is real-time processing technology that stores data
first and processes data later. It has changed the conventional
datamining approach, to reduce the processing time of refine-
ment of the data streams. At the same time, the technol-
ogy provides the specified time-based or length-based query
methods. For example, using a time-based window, CEP can
create an average shopping amount for a user over a period
of time.
The Esper is an open source implementation framework
of CEP, which monitors users’ shopping information and
triggers monitoring when risk event occurs. And the Esper
is a rule-based complex event processing engine, which can
FIGURE 1. CEP framework.
store themonitored risk information in the database or display
it on the user interface.
As shown in Figure 1, the event flows of the online shop-
ping process are sent to the Esper engine for processing.
The main purpose of this processing is to transform the
unstructured data into the structured data so that the system
can incorporate and process them.
According to the risk category of shopping information,
the system administrators will define corresponding process-
ing rules in advance. There is an event flow that goes into
the esper and matches it to the event rules base, and the
rule match is successful, then the engine triggers the listeners
and finally catches the risk event. At the same time, the risk
events are sent into the database or displayed them on the user
interface.
B. DEFINITIONS OF COMPLEX EVENT PATTERNS
We firstly obtain data streams of the online shopping pro-
cess and convert a unstructured data into a structured data
by byte filling, filtering and aggregation, etc. ; then use
them as the input event streams of the CEP engine; finally,
the online shopping risks are identified by the complex event
processing platform. Here, according to the typical user mali-
cious behavior patterns [6]–[10], we define the relevant vari-
ables, atomic events, and the relevant event patterns in this
section.
1) VARIABLE DEFINITION
The variables involved in the paper are as follows:
userID: ID number of a user
money: shopping amount of a user
orderID: order ID of a user
tradeway: payment way of a user
tradeplace: trading address of a user(1-paid, 0-unpaid)
tradetime: shopping time of a trading
tradestate: shopping status of a user
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FIGURE 2. Event process.
2) ATOMIC EVENTS DEFINITION
E is the set of events in risk detection of the online shopping
process
E = {en|n = 1, 2, 3...N }, en = {a, t1, t2}
TE is the set of events that capture user shopping behavior
in real-time.
TE = {en|n = 1, 2, 3...N }, en = {a, t1, t2}
a = {userID,money, orderID, tradeway, tradeplace,
tradetime, tradestate}
3) EVENT PATTERN DEFINITION
This section summarizes that the event pattern languages are
defined by considering single account and multiple accounts.
The event patterns of the single account mainly analyze
the shopping data streams of the same accounts, and capture
the user risk behavior by analyzing the shopping amount,
transaction address, and payment way. Mainly includes event
pattern 1, 2, 3 and 4.
The event patterns of the multi-user account mainly ana-
lyze that a person has different accounts for shopping.
As shown in Figure 3. Order replacement means that a user
uses different accounts to achieve the purchase of high-priced
item for a low price.Mainly includes event pattern 5 and event
pattern 6.
The risk behaviors of shopping are characterized by alge-
braic expressions, which are easy to be read and understood.
At the same time, the correctness of semantics is guaranteed.
Algebraic expressions construct atomic events for complex
events through operators. The threshold t is seted according
to the event pattern of the user’s online shopping process.
FIGURE 3. Multi-user complex events.
The symbols involved in the algebraic expressions of this
paper mainly include: Ci (i>=1) that represents the general
name of user shopping events; θi (i>=1) that represents
specific shopping information of the user; σ is the event
selection operator, for the pattern matching of the user event
flow, so as to find qualified target events; "→" is the event
sequence operator, such as A→ B, indicating that B occurs
after A occurs.
Event pattern 1. In the time period T, the user m, whose
shopping amount exceeds the average amount v, is alge-
braically expressed as follows:
C1 = σθ (TE)T ;
θ = (userID = m) ∧ (money > v) ∧ (tradestate = 1);
Event pattern 2. For user m, the four consecutive shopping
sessions are o1, o2, o3, o4, and the shopping times are t1,
t2, t3, and t4 respectively. The shopping amount shows an
increasing trend and the fourth shopping amount is more
than four times of the first shopping amount.The algebraic
expression is as follows:
C2→ C3;
C3→ C4;
C4→ C5;
C2 = σθ1(TE)t1;
C3 = σθ2(TE)t2;
C4 = σθ3(TE)t3;
C5 = σθ4(TE)t4;
θ1 = (userID = m) ∧ (tradestate = 1) ∧ (money = m1) ∧
(tradedate = t1) ∧ (orderID = o1);
θ2 = (userID = m) ∧ (tradestate = 1) ∧ (money = m2) ∧
(tradedate = t2) ∧ (orderID = o2);
θ3 = (userID = m) ∧ (tradestate = 1) ∧ (money = m3) ∧
(tradedate = t3) ∧ (orderID = o3);
θ4 = (userID = m) ∧ (tradestate = 1) ∧ (money = m4) ∧
(tradedate = t4) ∧ (orderID = o4);
m1 < m2 < m3 < m4;
m4 >= 4× m1;
o1 < o2 < o3 < o4;
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It is important to note that the operator ’’→’’ indicates that
there is a sequence among different events and that one event
can occur after another.
Event pattern 3. The payment way and shopping status
(paid) of the user m at time t1 are same as the time t2,
respectively p and 1 (paid). However, the trading addresses
of the two are different as p1 and p2, respectively. It should
be noted that the shopping interval of the same user account
is less the threshold t .
The algebraic expression is as follows:
C6→ C7;
C6 = σθ5(TE)t1;
C7 = σθ6(TE)t2;
θ5 = (userID = m) ∧ (tradeplace = p1) ∧ (tradeway =
w) ∧ (tradestate = 1);
θ6 = (userID = m) ∧ (tradeplace = p2) ∧ (tradeway =
w) ∧ (tradestate = 1);
t2 − t1 < t;
Event pattern 4. The trading address and shopping status
(paid) of the user m at time t1 are same as the time t2, where
trading address is p and shopping status is paid. However,
the payment way of the two are different asw1 andw2, respec-
tively. Besides, the time interval between the two signals is
less than the threshold value t .
The algebraic expression is as follows:
C8→ C9;
C8 = σθ7(TE)t1;
C9 = σθ8(TE)t2;
θ7 = (userID = m) ∧ (tradeplace = p) ∧ (tradeway =
w1) ∧ (tradestate = 1);
θ8 = (userID = m) ∧ (tradeplace = p) ∧ (tradeway =
w2) ∧ (tradestate = 1);
t2 − t1 < t;
Event pattern 5. Obtaining the online shopping information
with the user namem1 at the time t1, specifically: the order ID
o1, the trading address is p; the online shopping information
with the user name m2 is obtained at time t2, the order ID o2,
the trading address is p. The time interval between the two
signals is less than the threshold value t . Two user accounts
(actually the same person) place two orders at the same time,
and the algebraic expression is as follows:
C10→ C11;
C10 = σθ9(TE)t1;
C11 = σθ10(TE)t2;
θ9 = (userID = m1) ∧ (orderID = o1) ∧ (tradeplace =
p) ∧ (tradestate = 0);
θ10 = (userID = m2) ∧ (orderID = o2) ∧ (tradeplace =
p) ∧ (tradestate = 0);
t2 − t1 < t;
Event pattern 6. On the basis of the event pattern 5, one of
the two orders was not paid, whose algebraic expression is:
C12→ C13;
C12 = σθ11(TE)t1;
C13 = σθ12(TE)t2;
θ11 = (userID = m1) ∧ (orderID = o1) ∧ (tradeplace =
p) ∧ (tradestate = 0);
θ12 = (userID = m2) ∧ (orderID = o2) ∧ (tradeplace =
p) ∧ (tradestate = 1);
t2 − t1 < t;
III. IMPLEMENTATION
The simulation includes 10000 user shopping data for ana-
lyzing and validation. The system development environment
includes eclipse, Java (JDK version 1.9), Navicat forMySQL,
Esper engine 7.0.
The details of specific implementation process are pre-
sented, as follows:
A. EVENT PATTERN LANGUAGE
According to the relevant definitions and event descriptions
of online shopping risk, the corresponding rules are con-
structed by Event Processing Language (EPL), a subset of
SQL, extended with features for stream processing. Thus,
rules can be established in a familiar, easy-to-learn, high-level
language.
Corresponding to the event pattern 1 in Section II, the user
will be warned if the shopping amount exceeds the average
amount within a certain period of time, and the corresponding
EPL statement is:
EPL rule1:
According to the event pattern 2 in section II, during the
monitoring period, the shopping amount of the user presents
an increasing state, and the fourth shopping amount is four
times more than the first one, so an early warning can be
issued, and the corresponding EPL statement is:
EPL rule2:
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According to the event pattern 3 in section II, when the
user changes the shopping address within a short period of
time, an early warning will be issued. Our short time here is
10 seconds. The setting of 10s can meet the requirement of
the identifying risk behaviors.
The corresponding EPL statement is:
EPL rule3:
Corresponding to the event pattern 4 in Section II,
the user’s shopping mode changes within a short period of
time and an alert will be issued. The corresponding EPL
statement is:
EPL rule4:
For the event pattern 5 in section II, the same user places
two orders at the same time with different accounts, an alert
will be issued. The corresponding EPL statement is:
EPL rule5:
Corresponding to the event pattern 6 in section II, on the
basis of event 5, there is an order that has not been paid;
the prompt of order replacement attack will be issued. The
corresponding EPL statement is:
EPL rule6:
B. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTION
1) CREATE EVENT OBJECT
When building user online shopping structured data streams,
we need to filter the invalid data streams, such as the types
of products purchased by users, non-existent user names, and
invalid shopping records, etc.
Esper has special data structure conventions for events.
The event structures that can be handled by Plain Ordi-
nary Java Object (POJO), MAP, Object Array, Exten-
sible Markup Language (XML). In this paper, we use
POJO for structured representation of online shopping user
data.
Esper’s event object could be a container to send
events to Esper’s engine. The event class of online shop-
ping risk identification is defined as TranEvent (event
object), a standard Java class, which mainly include userID,
money, orderID, tradeway, tradeplace, tradetime, and
tradestate.
2) EVENT PROCESSING ENGINE
The Esper engine processor consists of the following parts:
• EPServiceProvier: creating data streams, threads and
engines.
• EPStatement: By registering the statement in the
engine, the predefined rules are added to the
engine.
• UpdateListener: Event listener, an interface provided by
Esper, will be triggered when an event comes in and
matches a predefined rule.
The event streams of user online shopping are arranged
based on the time stamp and sent to the engine for further pro-
cessing. Then EPLs are constructed to implement flow quires
and patterns matching based on the risk that may arise in the
shopping process. Once the query is registered, the incom-
ing shopping user data will be processed. Meanwhile it is
worth noting that all EPLs must be registered at the begin-
ning. Next, we need to add listeners to receive risk results.
Whenever a risk event (complex event) occurs, as long as it
matches the rules, a response will be sent to the appropriate
listener.
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FIGURE 4. Result of address change risk.
FIGURE 5. Result of order replacement risk.
FIGURE 6. Result of the user’s amount continuing to rise.
The code snippet to get the engine instance is: Esper handles the streaming data by using POJO. Because
it is a good way to represent trading events to better pre-
dict the risk of the user’s trading behaviors. The shopping
information that enters the Esper enginemainly includes: user
name, trade way, amount and other information. In this paper,
The user name has the unique ID for the risk identification
of online shopping. Using a unique ID, we can efficiently
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FIGURE 7. Result of the way of shopping change risk.
and quickly discover all the shopping orders of this user for
analyzing.
The code sends an event to the engine is as follow:
To construct EPLs, we need to register a query in the
engine, and the system will analyze the incoming events. The
code is as follows:
When the event flow conforms to the EPL rules,
the engine constantly displays the results to the listener.
The Esper engine provides an UpdateListener interface
to identify whether the user’s shopping behavior matches
the predefined event pattern. in the engine, and notify the
UpdateListener when an event comes in and produces a
result.
The code added to the listener is as follow:
We use the update() to complete a listener. The engine
publishes the risky events in the online shopping process to
the listener by using the new event parameters. The code for
the listener to obtain the query result is as follow:
C. RESULT
This section introduces the partial experiment results in
online shopping risk identification. It can be clearly seen from
Figure 4 that the shopping information of user 1 satisfies
event pattern 3. The shopping address of user 1 changes in
a short time, which can timely capture the shopping risk of
user 1. At the same time, we can also capture the case of order
substitution attack, as shown in Figure 5.
As can be seen from Figure 6, the shopping information of
the user 7 presents an increasing trend in a short time, which
is satisfied the event mode 2. As can be seen from Figure 7,
the shoppingway of the user 9 changes in a short time, and the
event mode 4 is satisfied, thereby identifying and capturing
the abnormal behavior of the user.
172094 VOLUME 7, 2019
Z. Ma et al.: CEP-Based Online Shopping User Risk Identification System
IV. CONCLUSION
Online shopping has brought great convenience for users.
However, there are also common problems in online shop-
ping: user data will be stolen, and criminals will use user
information for consumption or transfer which poses a great
threat to the property security of the users. Thus, the security
problem has become the main factors affecting the develop-
ment of online shopping.
In this paper, CEP can better fix the problem of risk
identification in the real-time trading by designing relevant
user trading scenarios and constructing complex event pat-
terns (EPL rules). By constructing EPL rules and related key
codes of Esper, the application technology and development
environment of the complex event processing platform can be
completely presented, which is conducive to the risk identifi-
cation in the online shopping systems. The analysis of shop-
ping data flows verifies the feasibility and practicability of
the proposed method which potentially improves the security
of online shopping environment. The proposed method can
play an important role of early real-time warning when risks
occur in the online shopping process.
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